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The background
 In Belgium: 
◦ Flanders has high level of extreme right vote
◦ Wallonia very low extreme right
 In France:
◦ FN scores high since decades
◦ Last presidential campaign showed UMP moving 
rightwards
 Other countries (Italy, Austria, Netherlands) 
allowed some government participation
 Xenophobe opinions spreading on social 
networks, in the media and among 
mainstream politicians.
 Public debate issues such as « Polish 
plumber », ROMs, muslim scarf
The background Online panel n=17,601
The general hypothesis
 In Flanders and France a « containment strategy » has 
been adopted : no governmental participation for extreme-
right parties
 At the other end, extreme right parties went into 
government in The Netherlands, Italy, Austria
 Our hypothesis :
◦ it does not prevent diffusion of xenophobe attitudes within the 
general population once an xenophobe political offer is present
 If true, we should observe 
◦ 1. That attitudes toward migrants depend on the presence of an 
explicit xenophobe political party
◦ 2. That the evolution of those attitudes does not depend of the 
presence of a containment strategy.
 If hypothesis is confirmed, it should be an interesting 
heuristic background for more detailed national studies
The operationalization
 Unfortunately, ESS doesn’t provide longitudinal 
data for Italy and Austria
 First possible strategy:
◦ Hypothesis: the difference in measured attitude 
toward immigrates  between extreme-right voters and 
others should decline where containment strategy is 
applicated
 Obstacles:
◦ 1. Too few extreme right voters in the sample
◦ 2. Strong underestimation of them even in countries 
where extreme right parties are quite strong
 Second strategy:
◦ Compare over time the evolution of attitude toward 
immigrants among a selection of countries
Simple measurement tools
 Our measurement from ESS data: 
◦ An index (opinion scale) that sums up answers to three 
items :
 Immigration bad or good for country’s economy
 Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants
 Immigrants make country worse or better place to live
◦ An index (attitude scale) that sums up answers to three 
items :
 Allow many/few immigrants of same ethnic group as majority
 Allow many/few immigrants of different ethnic group from 
majority
 Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside 
Europe
◦ Both indexes range
from -2 (neg. toward immigrants)
to +2 (pos. toward immigrants)
A focus on Belgium (1)
A focus on Belgium (2)
A focus on Belgium (3)
 Perplexity:
◦ On both scales, the differences between regions are 
very small excepted for Brussels
◦ On the Opinion Scale, the Walloon region shows 
slightly more xenophobe feelings 
◦ Evolution over time is very limited.
 Globally, the margin of variation looks very 
narrow and not clearly linked with the 
strength of extreme right-wing parties
 Belgian case seems to conclude against our 
hypothesis
A glance at some typical countries (1)
A glance at some typical countries (2)
ESS Round
A glance at some typical countries (3)
◦ Differences between countries are significant 
while remaining in a rather small range of 
variation
◦ Differences between countries do not go in 
the expected direction : 
 country with the biggest extreme-right party 
(Norway) is constantly less xenophobe than 
others
 Xenophobe feelings in UK are constantly higher
than in all other countries while there is no 
important extreme-right party in this country
A glance at some typical countries (2)
ESS Round
A glance at some typical countries (4)
◦ Longitudinal evolution shows that
 If we except Germany with some « erratic »
profile, the difference between rounds for each 
country are small 
 Differences between the most « migrant friendly »
and the less « migrant friendly » national opinions 
tend to slightly increase over time
 The mean for each country is around the neutral 
point of the scale
A glance at some typical countries (5)
A glance at some typical countries (6)
◦ On the whole, we see that regardless of the 
presence of an extreme-right political 
offer, evolution is marginal over time : 
◦ for all countries the difference between round 1 
and round 5 is maximum 0,3 on a scale 
ranging from -2 to +2
 Does it make sense to try and explain such small 
variations with sophisticated analyses?
A glance at some typical countries (6)
 Empiric results from ESS show that:
◦ Our first hypothesis does not match the data
◦ The data do not seem compatible with the rather 
widely spread vision of a xenophobe evolution 
across Europe.
 Some explanatory hypotheses :
◦ The xenophobe trend is present but it is framed by 
the religious question (islam) and not the migrant 
question
◦ The xenophobe trend is overestimated because of 
the dramatic impact of marginal electoral 
recomposition
◦ The xenophobe trend is emerging but has not yet 
been consistently measured.
The hypothesis of framing (1)
The hypothesis of framing (2)
The hypothesis of framing (3)
The hypothesis of framing (4)
 What can we see from the distribution for 
the various questions ?
◦ For countries considered, the answers to « a 
better/worse place to live » correspond to an 
almost perfect centered bell curve which 
means that there is probably no « strong »
opinion on that matter
◦ For the same countries, the curve is slightly 
bimodal with a second peak around 7 when it is 
question of economy or culture
◦ The shape of the curve for the three questions 
remains the same across time.
An attempt of conclusion (1)
 What can be concluded from the 
distribution for the various questions ?
◦ Except for very few respondents, immigration 
would be a consensual, or irrelevant topic?
◦ The survey fails to capture the way the topic 
is actually grasped among the population?
An attempt of conclusion (2)
 What can be concluded about our 
research question?
◦ Are political analysts overinterpretating slight 
changes in voting behaviour?
 « Myth of underlying trend? »
◦ Is attitude toward immigrants only marginally 
linked to the vote for extreme right?
 Is xenophobia only a secondary dimension of the 
extreme-right vote?
